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Grain transportation is one of the most important economic issues for grain
producers in the Northern Plains. The reliance on export markets and the
long distances to port position means that transportation costs have a
significant effect on the price received by farmers. 
In the prairie region of Canada, rail transportation is undergoing a major
transformation that will affect the competitive positions of agriculture in
both the United States and Canada and influence the direction of grain
flows between the two countries. Rail rates are no longer legislated
(although a cap is still in place), restrictions on branch line abandonment
have been lifted, and further deregulation of price and car allocation is
being considered. Some parties, including the railways, argue that a
completely deregulated system, similar to the U.S. system, is the only way
to achieve transportation efficiencies. Other groups, supporting the status
quo, argue that the regulation of rates is essential to control the monopoly
power of the railways. There has been very little discussion of other policy
options, with the exception of a limited discussion of  nationalized railbeds.
The U.S. experience provides a stark view of the likely outcome of
deregulation. When railways are not faced with competition from other
railways or from other forms of transportation such as barges, the evidence
suggests railways will price freight services at or near truck competitive
rates. Freight rates in Montana, where no effective rail and/or barge
competition exists, are approximately twice those at Kansas City and
Denver/Commerce City, where such competition exists.
The current cost-based regulated rates in Western Canada are similar to
those at Kansas City and Denver/Commerce City. Given similar distances
to port and the existence of only two railways (and no likelihood of new
entrants), deregulation in Western Canada is likely to result in freight rates
closer to those in Montana than to the current regulated level. The increase
in freight costs will result in transfers from producers to the railways,
distort production incentives, and create losses elsewhere in the economy.
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policy and trade.While maintenance of a regulated freight rate structure would address the
freight rate issue, other problems would result. The lack of price signals
reduces incentives for industry participants to perform. Branch lines are
less likely to be maintained in a regulated environment because railways
may be unable to charge the extra amount necessary to make them viable.
Railways may also disrupt the system—as a form of bargaining—to create
pressure for deregulation.
This report explores the option of the government encouraging entry into
rail service provision. Just as telecommunication companies are required
to allow competitors to use their phone lines, existing railways could be
required to make their track and switching equipment available to rail
operators who wish to run train service on a line, on the condition that the
access price covers the infrastructure cost. The paper examines the case of
the British railway system where the ownership of the track has been
separated from the operation of the rail equipment and the provision of
service, and explores the applicability of this model to grain transportation
on the Great Plains. In Britain, ownership of the track rests with a company
called Railtrack (although Railtrack was government-owned, it has been
privatized). Railtrack leases access to thirty train operators for fees that are
regulated by the Office of the Rail Regulator to cover maintenance costs
and provide a return on investment. The thirty rail operators then compete
to provide service to customers.
This model and others similar to it need to be developed and articulated
before they can be considered in the public policy forum. Nevertheless,
given the importance of rail transportation to the grain industry in the
Northern Plains, it is imperative that options such as these be investigated
to address the very thorny issue of freight rate and entry regulation.Table of Contents
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Introduction
Grain transportation is one of the most important economic issues for grain
producers in the Northern Plains. The reliance on export markets and the
long distances to port position mean that transportation costs have a
significant effect on the price received by farmers.
In the prairie region of Canada, rail transportation is undergoing a major
transformation that will affect the competitive positions of agriculture in
both the United States and Canada and influence the direction of grain
flows between the two countries. Rail rates are no longer legislated
(although a cap is still in place), restrictions on branch line abandonment
have been lifted, and further deregulation of price and car allocation is
being considered. Some parties, including the railways, argue that a
completely deregulated system, similar to the U.S. system, is the only way
to achieve transportation efficiencies. Other groups, supporting the status
quo, argue that the regulation of rates is essential to control the monopoly
power of the railways. There has been very little discussion of other policy
options, with the exception of a limited discussion of nationalized railbeds.
The purpose of this paper is to explore some policy options for providing
competition in the rail industry. The paper begins with a description of the
rail industry in Canada and the United States. An analysis of the market
structure of the industry indicates that lack of competition is a concern in
rail transportation in certain geographical locations. At the same time, it is
shown that regulation results in inefficiencies. The result is a policy
dilemma: Although some sort of regulation is required, regulation also has
costs.
The solution proposed in this paper is to examine types of regulation other
than those traditionally used. The option examined here is to require
railways to make their track and switching equipment available to anyone
who wishes to run train service on a line. This encouragement of entry into
rail service provision follows similar efforts in the telecommunications and
electrical generation industries. The paper examines the case of the British
rail system, where the ownership of the track has been separated from the
operation of the rail equipment and the provision of service, and explores
the applicability of this model to grain transportation on the Great Plains.
The Rail Industry in Canada
Regulation of grain transportation in western Canada began in 1897 when
Canadian Pacific Railways agreed to move western grain at the
predetermined statutory “Crowsnest Pass Rates” in exchange for a number
Grain transportation is
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of important concessions. These statutory rates were extended to all
railways in 1925. By the 1970s, Canadian Pacific (CP) and Canadian
National (CN) were losing substantial amounts of money hauling western
grain at the statutory rate and were no longer investing in transportation
infrastructure (see Vercammen [1996] for more detail on the material in
this section).
In response to this lack of infrastructure, the federal government purchased
hopper cars (provincial governments in the Prairies also participated in this
purchase), rehabilitated branch lines, and helped finance construction of a
grain terminal at Prince Rupert. As well, the federal government passed the
Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) effective August 1, 1984. The
main goals of the WGTA were to preserve the basic features of the
Crowsnest Rates (distance-based and equitable freight rates), ensure that
the railways would earn a fair return for hauling western grain, and provide
a mechanism whereby producers and the federal government would share
the total freight cost.
Under the WGTA, the federal government paid a share of the annual total
freight cost directly to the railways; the remainder was paid by farmers.
The annual Crow Benefit—or the amount paid by the federal government
—was initially set at $658.6 million. This value changed over time. In
1988–1989, the government payment to the railways was $695.1 million
(72.3 percent of the total freight charge); in 1994–1995, the government’s
contribution was $528.5 million (51.5 percent); and in 1995–1996, the
government’s share declined to 48.3 percent of the total freight charge.
The WGTA was eliminated effective August 1, 1995. The removal of the
WGTA was due to at least two reasons. First, under the recent General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WGTA was viewed as an
export subsidy and was subject to volume restrictions. Second, the
transportation subsidy represented a sizable financial commitment for a
cash-strapped federal government that, during the latter part of the WGTA
era, was no longer able or willing to maintain its financial commitment to
grain producers. 
After the removal of the WGTA, the Canadian Transportation Act (CTA)
was passed and it contains all the relevant legislation concerning the
transportation of western grain. An important element of the CTA is the
introduction of a Maximum Rate Scale, which effectively caps the level of
freight rates for the transportation of western grain. The CTA also contains
provisions for a review of the legislation in 1999 to “determine the
efficiency of the grain transportation system and [review] the sharing of
efficiency gains between shippers and railway companies” (CTA, section
155).
A final element of the grain transportation system in western Canada is the
allocation of cars to various shippers. The Car Allocation Policy Group is
responsible for allocating on a weekly basis the railcar fleet between
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) shipments and open market shipments and
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for specifying the precise allocation of cars by elevator company and
location.
The Rail Industry in the United States
Regulation of U.S. railways began in 1887 with the formation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). A major factor in the regulation
of the rail industry in the United States was a concern about monopoly
practices. The formation of the ICC was primarily a reaction against price
discrimination that targeted specific people, companies, and geographical
areas. Interestingly, however, the ICC sanctioned commodity price
discrimination in its acceptance of value-of-service pricing (Friedlaender
1969).
By the early 1970s, the U.S. railways were experiencing financial problems
as a result of business lost to the trucking industry and because the
regulatory environment prevented the railways from introducing pricing
flexibility and from abandoning unprofitable rail lines (see Wilson 1994
and the references therein). These financial problems led to the passage of
the Staggers Rail Act in 1980 which reduced the degree of regulation in the
system. The impact of deregulation for the period up through the mid-
1980s has been estimated using a number of different approaches (see
MacDonald 1989; Fuller, et al. 1987; and Wilson 1994). The conclusion is
that deregulation reduced freight rates in the Great Plains region of the
United States where intermodal competition was limited; deregulation
appeared to have little effect on rates in eastern Corn Belt areas where
barges provided competition. The general conclusion is that prior to the
Staggers Act the railways were able to use regulations to form an effective
monopoly and to raise prices to the level the market would bear.
The passage of the Staggers Rail Act resulted in a significant change in the
U.S. railroad system. The system became much more market-based for
many aspects of railroad operations including rate setting, line
abandonment, and car allocation. The ICC was also given the responsibility
to protect captive shippers from excessively high freight rates (see Wilson
1994 and the references therein). On January l, 1996, the ICC was removed
and replaced with the National Transportation Agency and the Surface
Transportation Board.
Prior to the Staggers Rail Act, cars were allocated under “common carrier
obligations” (i.e., cars were essentially allocated on a “first come, first
served” basis), and shippers were not assessed penalties if they canceled
the cars. At the current time, railcar allocation is predominantly controlled
by the railroads, with shippers having some input. Approximately half the
hopper car fleet is railroad-owned. The railroads also control up to
40 percent of the privately owned fleet giving them control of the
placement of 65 to 70 percent of the total available fleet. Railroads use
various approaches to allocate cars to individual shippers. Burlington
Northern, Union Pacific, and Canadian Pacific-Soo Line use a market-
based approach for the allocation of their cars. This approach involves the
With the passage of
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shippers bidding on cars to secure guaranteed placement at some future
date.
As an example, Burlington Northern (BN) uses three different approaches
to allocate their cars. The first method uses Certificates of Transportation
(COTs), which guarantee grain cars. Shippers bid for COTs in an auction-
type setting. Shippers who do not buy COTs at auction have the
opportunity to purchase them in a secondary market, which allows those
who previously ordered but no longer need COT cars to dispose of them.
Usually 30 percent of BN’s fleet is allocated to this use.
The second method allows shippers to place their own cars into BN’s
Guaranteed Car Pool (GCP) program. This program guarantees them a
claim on an equal number of cars in the future. During periods of low
demand for railcars, BN may refuse to allow shippers to use these private
cars on their tracks in order to increase demand for their own cars. Users
of the GCP have no guarantee on the rate (as they would with the COT
program). GCP users also carry a car cancellation fee of $200 per car. The
GCP program accounts for approximately 25–30 percent of BN’s total
fleet.
Finally, shippers may place orders for railcars under the ordinary tariff
system called the General Car Order (GCO) program. Cars are assigned to
various corridors based on historical usage and are awarded to individual
shippers according to demand; when the number of car orders exceeds the
supply, a lottery is used for allocation. This program accounts for
approximately 40 percent of BN’s fleet.
Market Structure of the Rail Industry
The rail industry in the Northern Plains region of North America is highly
concentrated. In Montana and the western portion of North Dakota, BN has
a monopoly. In Canada, the Prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
and Alberta are served by a duopoly—the two railways are CN and CP.
However, the areas served by CN and CP are often geographically distinct
so that in many areas the market structure is a monopoly. Figure 1 shows
the rail network in Saskatchewan in 1998. Although there is a corridor
running from the southeast to the northwest in which farmers have
reasonable access to both CN and CP, outside of this corridor most farmers
have reasonable access to only one railway.
In addition to facing a highly concentrated industry, grain shippers have
few other options available when it comes to shipping grain for export.
West Coast ports are 600 to 1,600 miles from grain production on the
Canadian Prairies, making trucking a very expensive option. Exporting
grain via the East Coast or Gulf ports requires trucking several hundred
miles plus significant waterway costs.
The presence of a duopoly—and in some cases a monopoly—raises
concerns about monopoly pricing should the Canadian rail industry be
completely deregulated. There are empirical and theoretical reasons to
High levels of
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suggest these concerns are valid. From a theoretical perspective, high levels
of concentration are a problem in an industry if the threat of entry is low
(an industry is highly concentrated if the largest four firms have more than
70–75 percent of the market). Without the threat of entry, existing firms
can raise price without fear of losing market share to new entrants. To be
a real threat, however, potential entrants must be able to enter and exit an
industry without much cost.
Although new firms can and do enter industries such as the grain handling
business, this ease of entry is not present in the rail industry. Indeed, the
cost to a new firm of entering the rail industry and building new rail lines
is likely to be prohibitive. The need to meet environmental regulations and
the expenditures required to acquire land are two reasons for this
prohibitive cost.
The CTA includes provisions that are designed to stimulate competition
such as confidential contracts, interswitching, competitive line rates, and
final offer arbitration (Vercammen 1996). However, the high concentration
in the industry and the geographic location of the rail lines reduce the
effectiveness of these provisions. Simply put, the CTA provisions will lead
to competitive prices if the railways are willing to actively compete with
each other. If the railways are aware of the market influence they possess
and act accordingly, the effectiveness of the CTA provisions will be
limited.
The empirical evidence also suggests that monopoly pricing is a concern.
Figure 2 shows the freight rates from four different delivery points in the
United States and Canada to the closest port. Three of these delivery points
are in the United States, and one is in Canada. The delivery points were
chosen based on the level of competition among railways and between
railways and other modes of transportation, the ability to handle a 52-car
spot, and the types of crops handled by the elevators and produced in the
local area. Where possible, delivery points were chosen with similar
distances to port. However, since the analysis is based on a per 1,000-ton-
mile basis, the distance to port is not a critical factor. The values in
Figure 2 are in Canadian dollars per 1,000-ton miles. Since the points
selected for comparison are roughly 1,000 miles from their respective
ports, the values represent the total amount paid per ton for grain shipment
(see Government of Saskatchewan [1997] for more detail on the material
in this section). 
The Canadian point is Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. Moose Jaw is
approximately 1,190 miles from Vancouver and was chosen because of the
presence of a large inland terminal and its location on the CP mainline. The
rate shown in Figure 2 reflects average railway costs. The rate does not
include an ownership charge for the government-owned hopper cars and
thus likely understates the actual costs.
The three points chosen in the United States are Shelby, Montana;
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Figure 2. Freight Rates for Wheat, Selected U.S. and Canada
Points, 1990–1995
were chosen because of their differing levels of competition between
railways and other modes of transportation. The destination ports (that is,
the ports served by the three originating stations) were chosen because of
the direct connections on Burlington Northern (BN) lines from the
originating station to the port. 
Shelby, Montana, to Portland, Oregon, is approximately 782 miles and is
served by only one railway, BN. Portland was chosen as the destination
point because the majority of the grain from the Shelby area is exported via
ports in the Pacific Northwest. Denver/Commerce City, Colorado, to
Galveston, Texas, is approximately 961 miles and is served by three major
Class 1 railroads (BN, Union Pacific, and Southern Pacific) and one small
carrier (Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company). Galveston
was chosen as the destination point because it is a major port for wheat
from this area destined for the Gulf ports. Kansas City, Kansas, to
Galveston, Texas, is approximately 861 miles and is served by numerous
Class 1 and small railway companies. In addition, Kansas City is served by
barge on the Missouri River system. The common destination point for
Denver/Commerce City and Kansas City can be used to determine if the
presence of barge transportation at Kansas City is reflected in rail freight
rates.
At least three observations and conclusions can be made from the data in
Figure 2. First, freight rates from Kansas City and Denver/Commerce City
are significantly lower than rates from Shelby, suggesting the presence of
effective rail and/or barge competition has a direct effect on the rates
charged by BN. Second, the Kansas City and Denver/Commerce City
freight rates have remained relatively constant over time, although there
have been some relatively small changes from month to month. This price
pattern suggests a relatively competitive market in which the price is
Rail freight rates are
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determined by the cost of providing the service. Third, the Shelby freight
rate has changed considerably over time, rising from just under Can $40
dollars per 1,000-ton miles in 1990–1991 to about Can $55 dollars per
1,000-ton miles in late 1995, a value that closely reflects the cost of
trucking. This freight rate pattern suggests that in Montana BN is operating
in a market where considerable latitude is available for setting prices.
The Policy Dilemma in the Rail Industry
The concern about monopoly pricing in the rail industry is mirrored in
other areas such as power distribution, telephone systems, pipelines, and
rail service. These activities are often described as natural monopolies and
have been either allowed to operate as regulated monopolies or operated as
monopoly enterprises owned by government. Transportation corridors such
as waterways, ports, roadways, and railways have also been largely claimed
for operation as monopolies through the public domain.
Government creation and regulation of these monopolies has been based
on the argument that these industries have economies of scale; one firm can
provide the good or service at lower cost than can two or more firms.
Although there are undoubtedly some economies of scale in the provision
of these services, these industries have had another more important
characteristic in common: the need to secure the right of access to a
continuous corridor to provide these services. The necessity of acquiring
an uninterrupted corridor meant landowners along the route could hold out
for a share of the potential profits, resulting in land acquisition costs
outweighing the returns that could be earned by a company wishing to
provide the service.
The historical use by governments of their power of eminent domain to
acquire land (including expropriation when necessary) suggests this entry
barrier is very large and that government action is required to facilitate the
entry of even a single firm. Providing entry to one player, however, creates
another problem: The monopoly that has been created is now free to raise
prices. Governments have historically reacted to this threat by instituting
public ownership and regulation of these industries.
The history of the rail industry in both Canada and the United States is a
good example of this pattern of government interest and involvement. For
example, in Canada, the railways were initially established through
government land grants. The rail industries in both countries have been
heavily regulated since the last decade or two of the 1800s. The evidence
on railroad pricing presented earlier also suggests that concerns about
monopoly pricing are real and need to be addressed.
The traditional form of regulation focuses on controlling price. Price
regulation, however, has its own costs. In both the United States and
Canada, regulation of the rail industry resulted in financial problems, lack
of investment, and poor maintenance of infrastructure (e.g., some branch
lines) that was no longer cost effective. More generally, the lack of price
signals inherent in regulatory environments reduces the incentive for
In both the United States
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industry participants to perform. Rail companies may also disrupt the
system—as a form of bargaining—to create pressure for deregulation.
Finally the uncertainty created by the possibility of switching to a
deregulated system discourages industry participants from making
investments that rely on regulated freight rates.
The unique structural characteristics of industries such as rail transportation
create a dilemma for policymakers. The prohibitive cost of entry means
monopoly pricing is a real concern and regulation is required. At the same
time, traditional price regulation is costly and creates inefficiencies.
The solution is to examine types of regulation other than those traditionally
used. One option is to use regulations to encourage entry into rail service
provision. Traditionally, entry into an industry has been thought to require
investment in new facilities and infrastructure. Since this route is
effectively blocked in the rail industry, attention needs to be focused on
encouraging entry into the provision of service.
Entry regulation has been introduced in industries outside of transportation.
For instance, in the field of telecommunications, regulations have been
introduced to force local companies to carry long-distance services from
other companies. This has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the cost of
long-distance services. Similarly, electrical utilities are being forced to
carry current from other suppliers to their customers, which has eliminated
their monopoly over their customers and has given them an incentive to
find lower-cost technologies (Joskow 1997).
These options are available for the rail industry. Just as telecommunication
companies are required to allow competitors to use their phone lines,
existing railways could be required to make their track and switching
equipment available to rail operators who wish to run train service on a
line, on the condition that the access price covers the infrastructure cost.
The next section examines the case of the British rail system in which the
track ownership has been separated from the ownership and operation of
the rail equipment, and hence the provision of rail service. The applicability
of this model to grain transportation on the Great Plains is also explored.
Rail Service Provision Entry—The British Rail System
The British rail system has historically been operated by British Rail, a
government-owned enterprise. In 1993, the British Railway Act was
introduced. Its objective was to create a system that operates in the public
interest by enhancing the competitive forces in the British railway system.
A government agency called the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) is
supervising the process of transition from the previously government-
owned and controlled system to the new system.
The rail infrastructure is currently owned by a company called Railtrack
which leases access to thirty independent rail operators. These rail
operators compete to provide passenger and freight service to the public.
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access agreements and the regulatory framework in place, the ORR developed a
business prospectus for Railtrack, which was then sold in a public share offering.
The ORR continues to regulate the rate of return for Railtrack. The ORR also
monitors contracts for rail and passenger service, along with other responsibilities.
Figure 3 contains a schematic representation of the set of public and private
institutions involved in the reform of the British Railway system. See Appendix
for a description of the British railway system.
Figure 3. The Operation and Control of the British Railway System
In addition to the actions and responsibilities mentioned in the policy statement,
the ORR is also involved in a variety of activities designed to facilitate more
efficient operation of the railways, including working with industry to develop
standard codes of practice, insurance and safety standards, and so on. During 1996
the ORR examined a merger between two rail operators and also investigated
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The ORR has been very proactive in creating a new set of institutions and
contractual agreements within the evolving British railway system. The
ORR seems to clearly recognize where a legitimate monopoly problem
may exist and then moves to improve contractual design to provide the
proper incentives. It also acts as a mediator when disputes arise. 
Applicability to the Great Plains
In theory at least, something like the British railway model could be
adapted for use in the Great Plains region. Existing rail companies could
be required to let other operators run trains on their rail track. This would
effectively introduce competition into the industry, with the result that
freight rates should drop to competitive levels. Railway companies would
likely specialize, with some concentrating on the provision of railway
infrastructure and others concentrating on train operations. If both Canada
and the United States adopted such a model, train operators would likely
operate in both countries and freight rates would equalize. If only one
country adopted this policy, competition in that country could be expected
to increase, resulting in relatively lower freight rates. Train operators from
both countries would likely enter the more competitive market, whereas
the restricted market would continue to have railway service and rail
infrastructure provided by the same company.
Major shifts in the rail industry would be required for this policy change
to be implemented. At the operational level, switching devices would need
to become much more automated and train location determination would
need to be improved. As is the case in the electrical industry where
electricity generation and transmission are being separated, train operation
logistics would likely have to be turned over to independent system
operators who would coordinate train movement. These system operators
would require a unique ownership structure that provides both
infrastructure owners and rail operators a say in the operations. Although
most rail infrastructure investment decisions could be left with the
infrastructure owners, some investment decisions may have to be made on
an industry-wide basis. Electronic “markets” may have to be created to
allocate demand across the various train operators (see Joskow 1997 for
an excellent discussion of the organizational changes required in the
electrical industry). Finally, an organization something like the ORR
would have to be formed to establish access terms and rates.
Since railways operating in the Great Plains region of the United States
and Canada haul much more than grain, this new regulatory environment
would have to apply to all the commodities handled by the railways. Also,
because the impact of a regulatory change would affect other carriers such
as trucking, changes to other transportation systems would be required and
would have to be coordinated.
Although this new regulatory model would generally improve the
economic performance of the rail system, some problems would emerge.
One of the most important is likely to be the impact of low demand
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volume on certain railway lines. The ability to provide rail service to low
demand areas may hinge on the ability of producers and shippers in these
areas to provide rail infrastructure at rates that make rail operation
profitable. Thus, mechanisms that allow effective local ownership also
need to be developed. 
Although these changes are substantial, changes of this magnitude are
occurring in the electrical industry. If anything, the separation of
electricity generation and transmission is much more difficult than the
separation of rail infrastructure provision and railway service provision.
Nevertheless, a great deal of thought and research needs to take place
before this type of regulatory reform could occur in the rail industry.
Summary and Conclusions
The unique structural characteristics of industries such as rail
transportation create a dilemma for policymakers. The prohibitive cost of
entry means monopoly pricing is a real concern and regulation is required.
At the same time, traditional price regulation is costly and creates
inefficiencies. The solution is to examine types of regulation other than
those traditionally used.
One option is to use regulations to encourage entry into rail service
provision. Traditionally, entry into an industry has been thought to require
investment in new facilities and infrastructure. Since this route is
effectively blocked in the rail industry, attention is focused on
encouraging entry into the provision of service. Regulations that facilitate
entry have been introduced in industries outside of transportation. For
instance, in the field of telecommunications, regulations have been
introduced to force local companies to carry long-distance services from
other companies. This has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the cost of
long-distance services. Similarly, electrical utilities are being forced to
carry current from other suppliers to their customers, which has eliminated
their monopoly over their customers and has given them an incentive to
find lower-cost technologies.
These options are available to the rail industry. One example is the British
railway system. In Britain, the ownership of the track has been separated
from the operation of the rail equipment and the provision of service.
Ownership of the track rests with a company called Railtrack. Railtrack
leases access to thirty train operators for fees that are regulated by the
Office of the Rail Regulator to cover maintenance costs and provide a
return on investment. The thirty rail operators then compete to provide
service to customers.
This model and others similar to it need to be developed and articulated
before they can be considered in the public policymaking framework.
Nevertheless, given the importance of rail transportation to the grain
industry in the Northern Plains, it is imperative that options such as these
be investigated to address the very thorny issue of freight rate and entry
regulation.
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APPENDIX
Railtrack
Railtrack’s 1995-1996 Network Management Statement outlines their role
in the overall structure. 
Railway Industry Framework. The reform of the railway industry
structure in Britain is based on separating the management of the railway
infrastructure from the operation of trains, stations, and other railway
transport services.
Railtrack, which took over the network in April 1994, owns the
infrastructure and manages it within the new railway industry framework.
It operates approximately 32,000 km of track and associated signaling
equipment and leases approximately 2,500 stations and approximately
90 depots to operators. Investment in maintaining and expanding the
network encompasses expenditure on track, structures, train control
systems, and stations.
Trains are currently run by some thirty operators. They provide
international, intercity, regional, and commuter passenger services and
freight services. Passenger service operations are initially being franchised
with the opportunity from April 1, 1999, progressively to introduce direct
competition. Freight services are already open to competition. Over the
period of this statement, the number and nature of network users is likely
to change as the new railway structure develops and the market changes.
. . . Operators who use the network and contractors who help to maintain
or develop the infrastructure must demonstrate that they can operate safely
and must provide Railtrack with acceptable safety cases which document
their ability to discharge safety responsibilities. . . . 
Railtrack, a government-owned company (it has since been privatized), is
a commercial undertaking which provides services to its customers under
contract. The contracts set out standards of service to be delivered by
Railtrack and provide performance incentives for their achievement.
Railtrack sets its priorities for network management and expenditure plans
to enable it to meet these contractual obligations and improve the
performance of the network.
Railtrack derives the majority of its revenue from charging passenger train
operators for using the network. . . .
Since 94 percent of income is earned from charges to passenger and
freight operators, Railtrack’s investment plans are to a large degree
concerned to protect or enhance the income from passenger and freight
operations by ensuring that it delivers against the terms of the access
contracts. Access agreements set out:16 RAIL SERVICE: THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION
• specified routes that the train operator may use; 
• the number and timetable parameters of trains using a route; 
• the type of trains and rolling stock that may be operated; 
• standards of service, which are designed to encourage
punctuality and reliability of trains;
• the charges for use of the network.
With the exception of fourteen of the largest stations, which continue to
be operated by Railtrack, nearly all stations and depots that are owned by
Railtrack are leased to and operated by train operators.
When determining passenger track access charges for the next five years,
the Regulator took the extent of Railtrack’s proposed renewal program
into account, so that Railtrack would be able to undertake renewals
without seeking to raise additional charges on passenger train operators.
Charges were set to remunerate Railtrack’s total expenditure, including
major renewal projects, across the entire network rather than as incurred
on a particular route.
The access conditions also set out the processes by which changes to the
network and the layout of stations are to be made. Railtrack and train
operators may both propose changes, but each has the right to object if the
proposed investment were not economic or if there were major disruptions
to other services that were not compensated for.
Access agreements are subject to the approval of the Rail Regulator who
aims to ensure that their terms will operate in the public interest as set out
in Section 4 of the Railways Act. The Regulator has published criteria on
the basis of which he will decide whether to approve, reject, or modify
such agreements. If a train operator cannot reach agreement with Railtrack
on acceptable terms, he can ask the Regulator to direct Railtrack to enter
into an agreement. 
. . . The Regulator is now consulting train operators on the broad structure
of the profit sharing mechanism. The key feature of the proposed
mechanism is that 25 percent of additional net income, over and above the
levels already taken into account in setting access charges, should be
passed back to train operators through a rebate of access charges, with
Railtrack retaining the other 75 percent. . . .
Tendering for Maintenance and Renewal Work. Railtrack has developed
a maintenance and renewal expenditure forecast for the next ten years.
Detailed rolling programs are being developed, setting out the way in
which the forecast work will be undertaken. Railtrack contracts out the
maintenance and renewal work of its network. Initial maintenance
contracts require the contractor to deliver efficiencies and open
competitive tendering will come into force as existing contracts expire.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 17
Closure Procedures. With the exception of a station or service designated
by the Franchising Director as experimental, any proposal to close a part
of the passenger railway network or stations would be subject to statutory
closure procedures. . . .
. . . Railtrack has no proposals to close any part of the passenger network
to passenger services and nor does it anticipate initiating any proposals for
such closures in the period covered by the Network Management
Statement.
The Office of the Rail Regulator 
A recent press release of the ORR outlined the major areas of activity for
the ORR during 1995-1996. 
• Access to the railway system: Over the year ORR completed the
process of approving the initial track and station access agreements.
• Railtrack: In preparation for the flotation (the selling of stock) of
Railtrack, the Regulator published a detailed statement, for inclusion in
the prospectus, on the general principles he has adopted in the
regulation of the railway industry and the approach he intends to take
following the flotation of Railtrack.
• Licensing and consumer protection: Over the year the focus of the
Regulator’s role has begun to change from facilitation, guidance, and
setting standards to monitoring and enforcing compliance with
obligations and contractual arrangements.
• Consultative Committees: The Rail Users’ Consultative Committees,
which are sponsored by the Regulator, have recently undergone a
review aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the Committees in
representing the interests of railway users, whilst making the best use
of resources. The results of the review, which was carried out by PA
Consulting, are currently being discussed with the Committees.
In March 1996 the ORR released a policy statement which sets out the
approach he intends to take in the following areas:
• The contractual framework, access arrangements and the allocation of
capacity: The general presumption is that capacity should be shared
fairly, and in accordance with the public interest, between all operators
wishing and able to use the facility.
• Charging arrangements for access: The Regulator expects that owners
of facilities, such as Railtrack, will carry out enhancement investment
where they receive an appropriate return through access charges. This
should cover at least avoidable costs plus a share of the benefits from
investment depending on the relative risks being taken by the parties
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• Licensing arrangements: Generally operation of new facilities will be
covered by licensing arrangements designed to protect the public
interest and consistent with those covering existing facilities.
• Implementation of projects: Contracts giving train operators access to
track, stations, and depots contain procedural rules designed to facilitate
enhancement investment. The Regulator anticipates keeping these under
review to ensure that this objective is achieved and he is willing to give
informal guidance as to the approach he would take in respect of
specific investments. 
• Sharing of information about investment plans: The Regulator
emphasizes the importance of sharing and coordination of investment
plans and the document outlines the various arrangements that are in
place to achieve this.
The Regulator will keep these arrangements under review to ensure that
they facilitate beneficial investment in the enhancement of the
infrastructure.